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Abstract 
 
In recent years, the ‘Western tradition’ has increasingly come under attack in anti-
colonialist and postmodernist discourses. It is not difficult to sympathise with the 
concerns that underlie advocacy of historically marginalised traditions, and the West 
undoubtedly has a lot to answer for. Nonetheless, while arguing a qualified yes to the 
central question posed for this special issue, we question the assumption that the West 
can be neatly distinguished from alternative traditions of thought. We argue that there 
is fundamental implicit and explicit agreement across traditions about the most 
difficult of issues and on standards about how to reason about them, and that the 
‘West’ has demonstrably learned from within and without itself. But we question the 
very viability under conditions of heightened globalisation and neo-colonialism of 
distinguishing between thought of the ‘West’ and thought outside the West. It is time 
to move beyond the reified assumptions that underlie the idea of ‘Western thought’, 
cast as an agent with a collective purpose. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, the ‘Western (or Northern) tradition’ has increasingly come under 
attack, in anti-colonialist and postmodernist discourses. Thus, the targeted tradition 
has on different occasions been labelled ‘mechanistic, materialistic, reductionistic, 
empirical, rational, decontextualized, mathematically idealized, … ideological, 
masculine, elitist, competitive, exploitive, and violent’ (Aikenhead, 1997, p. 5; see 
also Aikenhead, 1996, pp. 9, 10; Aikenhead, 2001, pp. 11, 12). Similar attributes of 
the nature of ‘Western’ science and knowledge1 (‘mechanistic’, ‘reductivist’, 
‘exclusionist’ and ‘particularistic’; as opposed to the ‘holism’ of indigenous or 
traditonal thinking and world-views) are rehearsed by Russell Bishop (1998), 
                                                 
1 While the concern in the examples provided here is almost exclusively with science and knowledge, 
and scientific epistemologies, a wider survey must surely also include political theory, anthropology, 
historiography, literature, aesthetics and ethics. 
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Ladislaus Semali and Joe Kincheloe (1999), Ivy Goduka (2000), and Scott Fatnowna 
and Harry Pickett (2002). In Glen Aikenhead’s characterisation of ‘Aboriginal’ or 
‘First Nations knowledge of nature’, it ‘contrasts with Western scientific knowledge 
in a number of ways’:  
• ‘in their social goals: survival of a people versus the luxury of gaining 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge and for power over nature and other 
people’;  
• ‘in intellectual goals: to co-exist with mystery in nature by celebrating mystery 
versus to eradicate mystery by explaining it away’; 
• ‘in their association with human action: intimately and subjectively 
interrelated versus formally and objectively decontextualised’;  
• ‘holistic First Nations perspectives with their gentle, accommodating, 
intuitive, and spiritual wisdom, versus reductionist Western science with its 
aggressive, manipulative, mechanistic, and analytical explanations’; and 
finally 
• ‘in their basic concepts of time: circular for Aboriginals, rectilinear for 
scientists’ (Aikenhead, 1997, pp.  5-6). 
 
Although Aikenhead’s characterisation of the ‘subculture of science’ appears to be 
little more than caricature and tendentious demonisation, on a par with the 
essentialising nonsense of those who arrogantly dismiss the possibility of non-
occidental contributions to knowledge and scientific research and inquiry, and despite 
his manifest romanticisation of the indigene, it is not difficult to sympathise with the 
concerns that underlie advocacy of historically marginalised traditions. The West has 
undoubtedly much to answer for. To begin with, significant quanta of Western 
knowledge, science, technology and ‘rationality’ have led to, or have had as a 
significant goal, the subjugation of nature, and so far have been devastatingly 
efficient. The pursuit of nuclear energy, wholesale environmental degradation, 
deforestation and destruction of flora and fauna, factory farming of nonhuman 
animals for human consumption, vivisection, and genetic engineering and 
manipulation are deplorable and – indeed – irrational. Moreover, the marginalisation 
and inferiorisation of indigenous peoples’ practices, skills and insights has, to a large 
extent, been arrogant and of similarly questionable rationality. The ravages and 
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lingering consequences of colonialism, oppression and subjugation attest to the cruel 
efficiency of a vast number of Western (-sponsored) practices. Current attempts by 
economically, industrially and technologically dominant nations to (re)colonise or 
appropriate for commercial gain these practices, skills and insights are exploitive and 
contemptible. Finally, certain traditional streams of Western thought have 
underpinned colonial and neo-colonial educational practices and systems. Historically 
these have lain at the heart of the cultural consequences of colonialism, in curricula 
that assumed the truth and greater importance of Western forms of knowledge, 
denigrating and marginalising so-called indigenous epistemologies and educational 
traditions.  
 
Nonetheless, there may be serious misconceptions and indeed biases at work in the 
unqualified targeting of ‘the Western tradition’. We, the authors of this paper, find 
binary opposition often useful, for reasons of conceptual clarity, amongst many other 
things. In this case, however, we reject the ‘binaries’ involved in the topic set for the 
special edition of this journal. We do not buy into the ‘problem’ as it is posed here. 
However, our responses to the questions posed for the special issue (‘Does the 
Western tradition have the intellectual resources to overcome its philosophical 
blindnesses?’; ‘Can it learn from, by, despite, itself?’; ‘Does it have the capacity to 
learn from other traditions?’) are reservedly affirmative, and we have distinct 
considered intuitions regarding the resources (of the tradition in question) required for 
this kind of learning. However plausible the charge of ‘philosophical blindness’ may 
sometimes be, there are several considerations that it would be foolish to ignore. 
Firstly, like its critics, Western thought is diverse and no longer neatly distinguishable 
from alternative traditions. There are no easy boundaries between ‘the West’ and ‘the 
rest’. Secondly, despite disagreement, there is a shared implicit assumption among all 
plausible views of the possibility of discussion and argument about even the most 
difficult ontological, epistemological and ethical issues. Thirdly, there appears to exist 
basic agreement on some standard of good and bad reasoning about ontological, 
epistemological and ethical matters in education, as in other areas of public concern 
and intellectual life. Fourthly, thought in the West has demonstrably both produced 
searching internal critique and also engaged with criticism from without, although 
such boundaries have become increasingly porous. Finally, we argue, fifthly, that a 
pre-occupation with putative Western ideas as a target for resistance in contemporary 
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educational theory mischaracterises contemporary neo-colonial forces and their 
significance. 
 
Of ‘blind spots’ and ‘blank spots’ 
 
As has been evident in the discussion of Aikenhead above, many friends of the 
‘subaltern’ pit their preferred orientation against a straw-person that is swiftly and 
summarily dispensed with. This kind of move also informs common invocation of the 
Western tradition’s ‘philosophical blindnesses’. Referring to ‘two generic forms that 
… ignorance can take’ (Wagner, 1993, p. 16), Jon Wagner claims that ‘blind spots 
and bank spots are at the core of all research endeavours’ (Wagner, 1993, p. 19): 
All scientists [including philosophers and educational researchers] operate in a 
world defined by what they think and know to be true. What they don’t know 
well enough to even ask about or care about are their blind spots. What they 
know enough to question but not to answer are their blank spots. The same 
phenomenal categories are alive for nonscientists as well, and in some ways 
the particulars of those categories for scientists and nonscientists have much in 
common. (Wagner, 1993, p. 16; emphasis added) 
Lesley le Grange, following Wagner, refers to blank spots and blind spots as ‘two 
kinds of ignorance produced by Western knowledge systems’, in particular (Le 
Grange, 2004, p. 69; emphasis added), especially in their hegemonic domination vis-
à-vis ‘marginalised epistemologies’(Le Grange, 2004, p. 70) and ‘indigenous ways of 
knowing’ (Le Grange, 2004, p. 71).  
Critiques of Western knowledge by feminists, sociologists of knowledge and 
post-colonialists operating within Western research traditions could be 
interpreted as shifting blind spots to blank spots – critiquing Western ways of 
knowing [is] now becoming part of the dialogues and conversations of 
Western scholars. This reflexive response is encouraging and opens up spaces 
for greater recognition of indigenous knowledges. However, the Western 
cultural archive produces blind spots, aspects that Western scholars will not 
know enough about or care about. (Le Grange, 2004, p. 74; emphasis added) 
It would appear, then, that Le Grange’s view, more or less explicitly, involves a 
negative response to the questions guiding the theme of this special issue of EPAT. In 
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the context of the present discussion, he seems to acknowledge too little here and 
rules out the possibility of further engagement.   
 
It is a common sociological sleight of hand to observe that the position authors critical 
of ‘other’/ ‘subaltern’ ways of knowing or science traditions  
is disturbingly devoid of self-reflexivity. There is no evidence of a 
consciousness of how their race and class positions them, and of how the 
Western discourses they have taken up in their educational journeys (have) 
dispose(d) them to work in particular ways, and also of the blind spots their 
ways of researching/ writing create. (Le Grange, 2005, p. 137)  
It is not unusual for those who are critical of politically correct stances and of 
glorification of the indigene or aboriginal to be accused of manifesting ‘imperialist 
tendencies’ (Le Grange, 2005, p. 128), of race- and class-based prejudice. 
 
However plausible the charge of ‘philosophical blindness’ against the ‘Western 
tradition’ may sometimes be, and from a historical perspective has often been, there 
are nonetheless several considerations that it would be foolish to ignore. 
 
How the West was never ‘one’: The responses 
 
1. 
Like its critics, Western thought is diverse and no longer neatly distinguishable from 
alternative traditions. The ‘Western tradition’ is not (any longer) characteristically or 
paradigmatically the ‘Enlightenment tradition’ or the ‘analytical tradition’. It 
incorporates a multitude of different philosophical perspectives and traditions: 
pragmatism, interpretivism, phenomenology and hermeneutics, critical theory, the 
different kinds of feminism and postmodernism, and critical realism, to name only a 
few. These perspectives and traditions are characterised not only by an openness and 
proximity to (self-)critique (we return to this point below) but also by brisk and 
tireless ‘border-crossings’. 
 
We take Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978/ 2003) as exemplifying several of our 
claims about Western thought. This foundational post-colonial text is not merely a 
devastating exposé of the ways in which this thread in post-Enlightenment Western 
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thought managed Orientalist representations of the Oriental as other, as an expression 
of the power of the coloniser over the colonised. Describing himself as ‘speaking both 
as an American and as an Arab’ (Said, 1978/ 2003, p. xxvi), Said wrote as a 
Palestinian but from within the Western academy, drawing on the ideas of a range of 
Western scholars that included Foucault, Gramsci and – ambiguously – Marx. With 
Orientalism now widely acknowledged, not least in the West itself, as one of the most 
shameful episodes in the history of Western learning, this text and the postcolonial 
literature that has burgeoned since its publication surely constitute evidence that the 
West, if there is still or ever was such an intentional entity, can and has learned from 
historical errors, overcoming such blindnesses. Globalisation of academic exchange 
and discourse, with scholars and ideas crossing geographic and intellectual borders 
with increasing ease and frequency, prompts the question of how any area of global 
thought could possibly learn by itself any more. None of these observations should be 
taken as assuming that sites of Western thought have yet sufficiently accommodated 
non-Western thought or that critique of Western traditions of thought is yet complete.  
 
2. 
Despite disagreement, there is a shared implicit assumption among all plausible views 
of the possibility of discussion and argument about even the most difficult 
ontological, epistemological and ethical issues. For one thing, this explains why many 
views are articulated in implicit or explicit conversation with theoretical adversaries. 
In ‘implicit conversation’ one has the adversaries ‘in mind’: these range from straw 
persons dispensed with in an easy and swift demolition job (a move that would not 
make one’s own, favoured position any stronger; for examples of this strategy, see 
Aikenhead, 1997, pp. 5-6; Aikenhead, 1996, pp. 9, 10; Aikenhead, 2001, pp. 11, 12) 
to imagining and carefully dealing with the strongest possible opposition to one’s 
stance (a move that is often arguably likely to strengthen the latter; see, for example, 
Carr, 2006, pp. 151-1542). ‘Explicit conversation’ concerns engagement with (and 
usually opposition to) views that have actually been articulated by ‘real’ theoretical 
opponents (see, for example, Carr, 2006, p. 151; Le Grange, 2005, p. 137). For 
another, the confidence placed in the possibility of discussion and argument about 
difficult philosophical issues in education (as in other areas of inquiry) is exemplified 
                                                 
2 Wilfred Carr anticipates three sets of compelling responses to his postfoundationalist argument, and 
he attempts to defend his position against each of these, with varying degrees of success.  
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in the writings of those who criticise ‘traditional research epistemologies’ of the 
‘Western world’ on the grounds of Western educational researchers’ ‘preoccupation 
with neutrality, objectivity and distance’, and who then go on to argue the case for 
indigenous people’s ‘participation in the construction, validation, and legitimization 
of knowledge’ (Bishop, 1998, pp. 200-201). While these sorts of exchanges (that 
characteristically happen at conferences on indigenous knowledge systems, 
ethnomathematics, and the like) often assume the form of ‘preaching to the 
converted’, the deeper intention is surely to win over a few converts from the other 
camp. In other words, more often than not, the aim of this kind of argumentation is to 
make a compelling (impersonal, objective, universally valid) case for one’s favoured 
position.       
 
3. 
There appears to exist basic agreement on some standard of good reasoning about 
ontological, epistemological and ethical matters in education, as in other areas of 
public concern and intellectual life. Whatever else may be said about the practical 
effectiveness of philosophy of education, it is surely true that serious and committed 
philosophical thinkers and practitioners of most if not all persuasions are ‘committed 
to following through the implications of rational argument and … impersonal rational 
principles (commitment to truth, impartiality, respect for evidence and the like)’ (see 
Carr, 2004, p. 56). It is surely also true that they would like their arguments and 
principles to appear uncorrupted ‘by a combination of irrational influences such as 
political expediency, vested interests and established power’ (Carr, 2004, p. 56).   
 
Whether or not these considerations have a peculiarly ‘Western’ origin, they are 
ignored by ‘other traditions’, and approaches to education that might be based on 
them, at the peril of the latter. 
 
4. 
The Western tradition is not only diverse and increasingly overlapping with others.  
Indeed, much of the critique of the worst of western thought has come from within the 
‘West’. As Le Grange concedes, citing the contributions of sociology of knowledge, 
feminist scholarship and postcolonial thought, extensive critique of ‘Western ways of 
knowing’ (Le Grange, 2004, p. 74) has taken place within the traditions of Western 
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research. To these examples can be added Critical Theory’s extended and often 
searing criticism of the intellectual tradition of  Enlightenment modernity, 
exemplified in Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s description of the world 
under western modernity, as ‘disaster triumphant’ (1979, p. 3). Instead of liberating 
human beings, they argue, instrumental reason is irrational, culminating in Nazi death 
camps and a capitalist system that commodifies through the market, including and 
especially in the culture industry.  
 
While such critiques were written from within the West, however, and as postmodern 
and post-colonial critique grew, they have become less easy to locate in relation to a 
clear intellectual and geographical context. Said’s work not only crosses borders, 
critiquing Orientalism by exposing its failings and drawing in post-colonial 
understandings while emphasising hybridity, warning against characterisations of 
cultures as distinct, homogeneous and monolithic. Said also advises against the 
assumption (which lies of course at the heart of Orientalist thinking) that terms like 
‘Orient’ or ‘West’ are ontologically stable, as both are fictions, products of human 
effort, organised and open to manipulation. Said himself declares a preference for 
careful analysis and critique aimed at understanding as against knowledge that is ‘part 
of an overall campaign of self-affirmation, belligerency and outright war’ (Said, 1978/ 
2003, p. xix) and ‘bursts of polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprison us in 
labels and antagonistic debate whose goal is a belligerent, collective identity rather 
than understanding and intellectual exchange’ (Said, 1978/ 2003, p. xxii).  
 
5. 
There are wider implications than this to Said’s cautions about simplistic binaries 
between thought that is supposedly of the West and of the rest. The ‘blind spots’ that 
arise from focusing too heavily on ‘the classical period’  of the society or language 
that is being studied, fixing them ‘for all time, for ontological reasons that no 
empirical material can dislodge or alter’ (Said, 1978/ 2003, p. 70), has further 
consequences, to which we now turn. 
    
Conceptions of ‘thought’ as fixed geographically and in time can imprison us in 
analytical categories that overemphasise ahistorical conceptions of colonialism and 
culture. Arif Dirlik argues that preoccupation with the cultural legacies of colonialism 
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distracts attention from what is distinctive about contemporary colonialism: ‘its 
relationship to capitalism’ (Dirlik, 2002, p. 428). This lends exaggerated importance 
to the past and promotes obliviousness to how power has been reconstructed by 
globalized capitalism. 
 
Dirlik observes how the relationship between colonizer and colonized has tended to 
be understood in Manichean terms, as opposed to one another, cast in terms of race, 
underplaying the cultural entanglement  between the two, bound together in a 
structural dialectic; and how Third World voices have demanded that the 
psychological and cultural aspects of colonialism be recognised, thus shifting the 
analytical emphasis away from ‘the economic and political to the cultural and the 
personal experiential’ (Dirlik, 2002, p. 431). So political economy has ceased to 
mediate in questions of culture (Dirlik, 2002, p. 432).  
Globalization returns us to a condition where once again it is capitalism, rather 
than colonialism, that appears as the major problem. The avoidance of this 
question is a serious problem of contemporary postcolonial criticism which, 
focused on past legacies, is largely oblivious to its own conditions of existence 
and its relationship to contemporary configurations of power.  It also ignores 
the ways in which its interpretation of the past may serve to promote, or at 
least, play into the hands of a globalized capitalism. (Dirlik, 2002, p. 440) 
 
 
No doubt indigenous people in postcolonial contexts have suffered marginalisation 
and oppression. However understandable the assertion of non-Western, indigenous 
values and epistemologies as a response to the cultural alienation caused by 
colonialism, over-emphasising this fact can distract from recognition of the full range 
of such marginalisation and oppression. Colonialism’s consequences are also 
material, in the form of growing international and intranational poverty. But 
furthermore, at the same time as capitalism’s self-reinvention has brought former 
colonies into the global economy, postcolonial critics are themselves now inserted 
into the global intellectual elite, drawing on practices of critique largely drawn from 
‘western’ intellectual traditions of criticism located within traditions of cultural 
nationalism no less western in  origin. Particularly in education, resistance to the 
lingering effects of colonialism that focuses too strongly on cultural marginalisation 
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distracts critical attention from the destruction primarily wrought by neoliberalism, 
ineffectually fought by reversion to epistemic and moral traditionalism. Addressing 
human needs through education – including by widening policy, curricula and 
pedagogy with ways of knowing beyond the worst of the historical West – requires 
critical attention to the power and influence of global capital, the ongoing destruction 
wrought by industrial technology, the harnessing of education to the production of 
labour power to serve the interests of capital, and the attendant subversion of 
education through the imposition of business-inspired models of management of 
education on its organisation.   
 
Furthermore, and crucial to possibilities for resistance to global capitalism and its 
increasing influence on education  global capitalism is no longer geographically 
confined to the West. On the contrary, with the decline of Europe and the rapid rise of 
Eastern giants, although the knowledge that historically underpinned Western science 
and technology and so their destructive effects may have been Western in origin, 
capitalism is hardly just ‘Western’ any longer (Dirlik, 2002, p. 444).  
 
Conclusion: Beyond ‘Western thought’  
 
While arguing a qualified affirmative answer to the key question of whether the 
Western tradition can overcome its blindnesses, we have acknowledged both those 
historical blindnesses and their destructive consequences. But, emphasising the 
diversity of thought in the West and its imbrication now in globalised flows of ideas 
that belie assumptions about geographical exclusivity, we have argued that Western 
thought has drawn on resources from within and without to learn, but by no means by 
itself. Yet, where we have used the term ‘Western thought’ for the sake of argument, 
we find this reified category no longer useful; it mistakenly assumes too that there 
could be a collective Western agent with both a unified sense of themselves and a 
collective purpose that includes a coherent single stance towards other forms of 
‘thought’. As long as vanguardist postcolonial leaders and intellectuals pursue a 
politics of resentment, in terms that Said warns against, we will remain distracted 
from the most virulent forces that threaten global well-being, not least in its 
educational systems.  
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